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Abstract 
 
This paper tests whether aggregate matching is consistent with unemployment being mainly 
due to search frictions or due to job queues.  Using U.K. data and correcting for temporal 
aggregation bias, estimates of the random matching function are consistent with previous 
work in this field, but random matching is formally rejected by the data.  The data instead 
support ‘stock-flow’ matching.  Estimates find that around 40% of newly unemployed 
workers match quickly - they are interpreted as being on the short-side of their skill markets. 
The remaining workers match slowly, their re-employment rates depending statistically on 
the inflow of new vacancies and not on the vacancy stock.  Having failed to match with 
existing vacancies, these workers wait for the arrival of new job vacancies.  The results have 
important policy implications, particularly with reference to the design of optimal 
unemployment insurance programs. 
 
 
Keywords:  Matching, Unemployment, Temporal aggregation. 
JEL Classification:  E24, J41, J63, J64. 
 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’sLabour Markets Programme 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We are grateful to Alan Manning and seminar participants at CREST (Paris) and CEP (LSE) 
for very useful comments.  
 Barbara Petrongolo is a member of the Centre for Economic Performance and of the 
Department of Economics, London School of Economics.  Contact:  b.petrongolo@lse.ac.uk.  
 Melvyn Coles is a Professor of Economics, University of Essex and a member of 
I.A.E. (ICREA, Barcelona). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London  WC2A 2AE 
 
Ó Melvyn Coles and Barbara Petrongolo, submitted January 2003 
 
ISBN 0 7530 1629 X 
 
Individual copy price:  £5 
A Test Between Unemployment Theories 
Using Matching Data 
 
Melvyn Coles and Barbara Petrongolo 
 
 
June 2003 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 1 
 
2. The Empirical Framework 5 
 
3. Temporal Aggregation 6 
 
4. Identification with Temporally Aggregated Data 8 
 4.1 Random Matching 8 
 4.2 Stock-Flow Matching 10 
 4.3 Job Queueing 11 
 
5. Estimation 11 
 5.1 The Data 12 
 5.2 Results 16 
 5.3 The Results Using HP Filtered Data 22 
 
6. Conclusion 25 
 
References  29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council 
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to develop a test using matching data which identifies whether
aggregate matching is consistent with unemployment being mainly due to matching
frictions (as described by the matching function literature) or due to job queues. The
issue is important as optimal labor policy as implied by the matching framework (e.g.
Pissarides (2000)) is quite diﬀerent to that implied by an eﬃciency wage model (e.g.
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)).
The test distinguishes between the two approaches by identifying the extent to
which aggregate re-employment rates are driven by the inflow of new vacancies. For
example, both the random matching and the directed search approaches (e.g. Mont-
gomery (1991), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Burdett, Shi andWright (2001)) assume
the re-employment rate λ of an unemployed worker depends on the contemporaneous
stocks of vacancies V and unemployed job seekers U in the market; i.e. λ = λ(V, U).
In contrast, job queues suggest that unemployed job seekers are on the long side of
the labour market. If v denotes the inflow of new vacancies then frictionless match-
ing, as described in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), implies λU = v, where the outflow
of the U unemployed workers equals the inflow of new vacancies. This implies an
average re-employment hazard rate of the form λ = v/U which, critically, depends on
the inflow of new vacancies v rather than on the current vacancy stock V. The tests
developed here rely on the fact that the stock of vacancies V and the inflow of new
vacancies v have quite diﬀerent time series properties.
In implementing this test, this paper notes that the econometric framework is
trying to identify a continuous time matching process while using time series data
which record the matching rate as total matches over each month.1 We show the
underlying matching process can be identified for two particular cases; (a) random
matching, where the stock of vacancies matches with the stock of unemployed job
seekers, and (b) stock-flow matching, which we now describe.
1Typically such temporal aggregation of the data is ignored in the matching literature, though
i t h as b e e n not ed t hat i g n or ing s uch ag gr e ga tion eﬀect s intro duces a p ot ent ial bias (see Burdett et
al (1994), Berman (1997), Gregg and Petrongolo (1997) and also Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
f or a recent su rvey).
1
The stock-flow matching literature (e.g. Taylor (1995), Coles and Smith (1998),
Coles and Muthoo (1998), Coles (1999), Gregg and Petrongolo (1997), Lagos (2000))
assumes that workers do not search randomly for vacancies. Instead the unemployed
have a fairly good idea about where to look for suitable vacancies - they may check
newspapers and professional journals for advertised vacancies, contact employment
agencies (both public and private) or ask friends and relatives. As in the directed
search literature, the stock-flow matching approach assumes the polar case that work-
ers are fully informed on all vacancies currently on the market. Unlike the directed
search approach, however, vacancies and workers are assumed to be heterogeneous,
and workers can submit multiple job applications. This generates a simple sampling
eﬀect: a newly unemployed worker keeps applying for jobs from the current vacancy
stock until either the worker is oﬀered a job (and the worker accepts it) or the cur-
rent stock of vacancies is fully sampled and the worker has found none suitable. In
that latter case, the worker is left waiting for suitable new vacancies to come onto
the market. This generates “stock-flow” matching where the stock of (longer-term)
unemployed workers wait to match with the inflow of new vacancies, while the inflow
of newly unemployed workers potentially matches with the current vacancy stock.
A crucial aspect of stock flow matching is that there is unobserved heterogeneity
across vacancies and unemployed job seekers. Stock-flow matching implies an econo-
metric specification where some proportion p of newly unemployed workers are on
the short side of their respective submarket and so match quickly. The remaining
proportion 1 − p are on the long-side and must wait for a suitable vacancy to enter
the market. These latter workers match at an average rate λ = λ(v, U), which de-
pends on the inflow of new vacancies, with crowding out by competing unemployed
job seekers. Also note this stock-flow matching approach is a straightforward gen-
eralisation of the eﬃciency wage literature with identical workers; e.g. Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984) which implies equilibrium matching rates p = 0 and λ = v/U .
This paper therefore nests the standard matching function approach and the stock-
flow matching approach within a single econometric framework and so tests between
them. Distinguishing between the two approaches requires vacancy inflow informa-
tion. Unfortunately such data is not available for the United States where inches
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of help-wanted advertisements are used to measure vacancies and there is no infor-
mation on whether a particular job advertisement is new or is a re-advertisement.
Job Center data in the United Kingdom, however, provides this flow information for
the U.K. labor market. Nevertheless even though the results presented are based
on U.K. information, the Conclusion uses the resulting insights to provide a useful
re-interpretation of U.S. matching data.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section shows how to control econo-
metrically for temporal aggregation of the data. The issue being that even with
pure random matching, the total number of matches over any given month is directly
correlated with the inflow of new vacancies during that month. Taking temporal
aggregation of the data into account requires constructing suitable ‘at risk’ measures
of the monthly stock of vacancies and unemployed job seekers. In particular, the
appropriate ‘at risk’ measure for vacancies is a weighted sum of the initial stock of
vacancies and the number of new vacancies that enter within the month. Those ‘at
risk’ measures are estimated using standard Maximum Likelihood techniques.
Based on U.K. matching data for the period 1985-99, there are two sets of results.
The first set estimates the identifying equations assuming random matching and
compares them to results obtained using OLS. Assuming a standard Cobb-Douglas
specification, λ = aUαV β where the bars denote ‘at risk’ measures, we first establish
that ignoring temporal aggregation of the data leads to a large downward bias on
the estimated vacancy coeﬃcient. The intuition is that the stock of vacancies at the
start of the month is a poor proxy for the total number of vacancies at risk over
the month - there is high vacancy turnover within the period of a month, where the
average duration of a vacancy is only 3 weeks. Measurement error implies that an
OLS estimate of the vacancy parameter β is downward biased (the actual estimate is
around 0.3, which is consistent with Pissarides (1986) who uses related data for the
U.K.). Instead using MLE techniques to identify the appropriate ‘at risk’ measures
for vacancies and unemployment gives a much better fit of the data, the hypothesis
of constant returns to matching is accepted and the estimate for β is around one half
(and α = −β). These latter results are consistent with much of the previous work
in this field (e.g. Blanchard and Diamond (1989)) and are those typically used for
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calibration exercises.
But given we control econometrically for temporal aggregation of the data, the
critical over-identifying restriction is that the inflow of new vacancies, v, should not
have any additional explanatory power for λ. We find that including vacancy inflow
v in the econometric specification for λ not only much improves the overall fit and
is highly significant, the vacancy stock parameter becomes insignificant and wrong-
signed. The inflow of new vacancies therefore plays a more direct role on observed
matching rates than is consistent with random matching.
This result is perhaps not overly surprising given other features of the U.K. labor
market. For example the average uncompleted spell of unemployment had mean value
of around 14 months during this period. It seems unlikely that such extended spells of
unemployment could be due to matching frictions alone. Furthermore, approximately
30% of all new vacancies posted in U.K. Job Centers are filled on the first day.
Coles and Smith (1998) also establish that the re-employment probabilities of those
unemployed for more than one month in the U.K. are highly correlated with the
inflow of new vacancies and uncorrelated with the stock. Together these facts strongly
suggest stock-flow matching - the stock of longer-term unemployed workers chase new
vacancies as those vacancies come onto the market. Unfortunately the estimates of
Coles and Smith (1998) are flawed as they ignore temporal aggregation eﬀects and
their dependent variable is constructed from right hand side conditioning variables.
The MLE approach developed here corrects for both of these defects.2
The second set of results estimate the identifying equations assuming stock-flow
matching. Estimates reported in Table 4 find p ≈ 0.5 and is highly significant. Al-
though unemployment rates for this period were rather high, this estimate implies
that around half of newly unemployed workers have skills in relatively short supply
and quickly find work. Estimates of the matching rates of the longer term unem-
ployed, using functional form λ = avβUα, imply β close to one and constant returns
to matching; i.e. α = −β and so λ = λ(v/U). The overall fit is also significantly
better than for the random matching specification.
These results have important policy implications. For example assuming all unem-
2Also see Gregg and Petrongolo (1997).
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ployment is frictional, the optimal unemployment insurance (UI) literature typically
recommends that UI payments should decrease with duration to promote greater job
search eﬀort (e.g. Shavel l and Weiss (1979) a nd mo re rece ntly Hop e nhayn and Ni col-
i ni (1997) and Fred riksson and Holmlund (2001)).3 But the results obtained here
suggest that the longer term unemployed are job rationed - they chase new vacancies
as those vacancies come onto the market. Pure job displacement eﬀects imply that
reducing the quality of UI coverage to encourage even greater job chasing eﬀort is
counterproductive.
2 The Empirical Framework
At each date t the re-employment probabilities of unemployed workers are described
by a pair (p(t),λ(t)). p(t) is the proportion of workers laid oﬀ at date t who find
immediate re-employment, while λ(t) is the average re-employment rate of workers
who have been unemployed for some (strictly positive) period of time. As described
in the Introduction, diﬀerent equilibrium theories of unemployment have diﬀerent
implications for these variables. In particular, each theory i implies functional forms
(pi,λi) : (U, V, u, v) → R2+ where U, V are the stocks of unemployed workers and
vacancies respectively, and u, v refer to the flow of new job seekers and new vacancies
into the market.
The random matching approach, theory i = M, implies pM = 0 - it takes time
to find work - and an average re-employment hazard rate λM = λM(V, U), where
constant returns to matching imply λM = λM(V/U).As described in the Introduction,
stock-flow matching (theory i = SF ) assumes there are two sides to any market -
a long side and a short side. With probability p = pSF (V, u), a newly unemployed
worker not only finds a suitable vacancy in the current stock of vacancies V , but
is also oﬀered the job (i.e. there may be crowding out by other recently laid-oﬀ
workers u). Although it might appear reasonable to assume that such workers face
some search frictions - for example, they might take some time to identify their most
preferred vacancy - econometric tractability requires that we assume these workers
3But s ee a l so Ca huc a nd Le hma nn ( 20 00 ) for a ch alle ng e o f this vie w.
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match arbitrarily quickly. We shall return to this issue in the Conclusion. Given that,
with probability 1−pSF the worker cannot match with the current vacancy stock and
so has to wait for new suitable vacancies to enter the market. In that case, the worker’s
re-employment hazard rate λ = λSF (v, U), where this worker has to compete against
the other unemployed workers to match with the inflow of new vacancies. Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) describ e  a sp ecial case of sto ck -flow match ing. If unem ployed
workers are identical and so all are on the long-side of the market, then job queuing
(i = Q) implies pQ = 0 (it takes time to find work) and λQ = v/U. For econometric
purposes we consider a more general specification of the form λQ = λQ(v, U), and
note that job queueing (i = Q) implies the test p = 0 on the stock flow regression
equations.
We now show how to identify (pi,λi) using data which is temporally aggregated.
3 Temporal Aggregation
Let M(t) denote the expected flow matching rate at date t. M(t) satisfies
M(t) = p(t)u(t) + λ(t)U(t), (1)
where a proportion p(t) of the newly unemployed match immediately (or at least
very quickly) while the stock of unemployed workers U(t) match at rate λ(t). The
econometric issue is identifying this continuous time matching relationship using data
which is recorded as a monthly time series.4
As the data record the stock of unemployed workers Un and vacancies Vn at the
beginning of each month n ∈ N , we have that U(t) = Un at date t = n. For t ≥ n it
follows that
U(t) = Une
−
R t
n λ(s)ds +
Z t
n
u(t0)[1− p(t0)]e−
R t
t0 λ(s)dsdt0, (2)
where the first term describes the number unemployed at the start of the month who
remain unemployed by date t, and the second describes all those laid-oﬀ at some date
t0 ∈ [n, t] and have failed to find employment by date t.
4This problem was first noted by Burdett et al. (1994).
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Given there is no other available information, the first identifying assumption is
that newly unemployed workers and new vacancies enter at a uniform rate within any
given month. As the data record the total inflows within the month, which we denote
as un, vn, this identifying restriction implies u(t
0) = un, v(t0) = vn for all t0 ∈ [n, n+1).
(2) then simplifies to
U(t) = Une
−
R t
n λ(s)ds + un
Z t
n
[1− p(t0)]e−
R t
t0 λ(s)dsdt0.
The second identifying restriction uses a plausible approximation suggested by
th e data. I n b o th the Blanchard and D iamo nd (1989) data (see F igure 3 in the
C o nclu sion), an d t he data use d he re (s ee Figure s 1 and 2 b elow ), t he prop ortional
monthly change in the stock of unemployment and vacancies is small. Assuming the
matching elasticities of λi, pi with respect to the stock variables are not too high
( see th e estimates rep o rted b elow) a nd gi ve n the identifyin g res triction that th e flow
variables are constant within the month, a reasonable approximation is that λ, p do
not vary much within the month. In that case, assuming λ(t) = λn, p(t) = pn for all
t ∈ [n, n+ 1), the previous equation reduces to
U(t) = Une
−λn(t−n) + un[1− pn]
1− e−λn(t−n)
λn
,
and putting t = n+ 1 gives
Un+1 = Une
−λn + un[1− pn]
1− e−λn
λn
.
Now let Mn denote total matches over the month. Noting that
Un+1 − Un = un −Mn,
we can substitute out Un+1 using the previous equation and solve for Mn. Doing that
implies the following Proposition.
Proposition 1: The Temporally Aggregated Matching Function
Given the identifying assumptions
(i) u, v are constant within the period, and
(ii) λ, p are constant within the period,
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then total matches over the period are
Mn = Un[1− e−λn] + unpn + un(1− pn)
·
e−λn − 1 + λn
λn
¸
. (3)
The temporally aggregated matching function described in (3) is composed of three
terms. The first describes those in the initial stock of unemployed workers who suc-
cessfully match within the month, the second describes those laid oﬀ who immediately
find work, and the third describes those laid oﬀ who subsequently match with a new
vacancy.
A similar matching structure also applies to vacancies. In particular, if a new
vacancy matches immediately with probability q and if it fails to match immediately
subsequently matches at rate µ, symmetry implies
Mn = Vn[1− e−µn ] + vn
·
1− (1− qn)
1− e−µn
µn
¸
. (4)
This temporally aggregated matching function was first identified by Gregg and
Petrongolo (1997). We now show that estimating both matching equations (3) and
(4) consistently involves the construction of ‘at risk’ measures for the stock of va-
cancies and unemployed workers. As the diﬀerent matching theories imply diﬀerent
identifying restrictions, we consider each separately.
4 Identification with temporally aggregated data.
4.1 Random Matching
Define Un, V n as
Un = Un +
e−λn − 1 + λn
λn[1− e−λn]
un, (5)
V n = Vn +
e−µn − 1 + µn
µn[1− e−µn]
vn. (6)
Un can be interpreted as the ‘at risk’ measure of unemployed workers within month
n. For example λn ≈ 0 (i.e. each unemployed worker matches very slowly) implies
Un ≈ Un + 0.5un. Given nobody finds work (λn ≈ 0) then each unemployed worker
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who becomes unemployed in month n is, on average, unemployed in that month for
exactly half of it (assuming new unemployed workers enter the market at a uniform
rate). Hence Un+0.5un measures the average number of unemployed workers at risk
over the whole month. Alternatively, suppose λn →∞ which implies Un → Un+ un.
If instead workers match arbitrarily quickly, then Un+un is the eﬀective total number
‘at risk’ as each unemployed worker who enters the market matches immediately. (5)
therefore computes the consistent ‘at risk’ measure of unemployment for all possible
matching rates λn ≥ 0. (6) describes the appropriate ‘at risk’ measure for vacancies.
These at risk measures are useful as the temporally aggregated matching function,
described in (3), now simplifies to
Mn = Un[1− e−λn ],
(where random matching implies pn = 0). Hence random matching and temporal
aggregation of the data implies total matches in month n can be decomposed into
the total ‘at risk’ number of unemployed workers in month n, who match at average
rate λn. Further, (4) also implies
Mn = V n[1− e−µn],
which has the same interpretation. This implies our identifying restriction
Un[1− e−λn ] = V n[1− e−µn ], (7)
which says that the number of workers who match equals the number of vacancies
that match.
Given data {Un, Vn, un, vn}, the above ‘at risk’ measures can be identified by
assuming an econometric specification of the form
λn = λM(Un, V n; θ), (8)
which assumes that the average matching rate over the month depends on the average
number of unemployed workers and vacancies which were ‘at risk’ over that month.
Given parameters θ and the data, equations (5)-(8) can be solved for the 4 un-
knowns Un, V n,λn and µn [where random matching implies pn = qn = 0]. Conditional
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on θ, the predicted number of matches in the month is then
Mn(θ) = Un[1− e−λn ], (9)
where the identifying restriction (7) implies the predicted number of matches is con-
sistent with both of the temporally aggregated matching functions (equations (3)
and (4)).5 Given data on actual matches,  M  n , we can then estimate θ us ing maximum
l ike liho o d es t imation ( s ee b elow ).
4.2 Stock-Flow Matching
The same approach applies to stock flow matching, but the identifying restrictions
are diﬀerent. This time the appropriate ‘at risk’ measure for the stock of unemployed
workers is
Un = Un +
e−λn − 1 + λn
λn[1− e−λn]
(1− pn)un, (10)
and
V n = Vn +
e−µn − 1 + µn
µn[1− e−µn ]
(1− qn)vn, (11)
for the stock of vacancies.
Using (3) and (4), stock flow matching implies
qnvn = Un[1− e−λn ] + un(1− pn)
·
1− 1− e
−λn
λn
¸
,
as the number of unemployed workers who match with the flow of new vacancies
equals the number of new vacancies that match immediately. The definition of Un
implies this condition can be written more simply as
qnvn = (1− e−λn)Un. (12)
The same argument applies to the stock of vacancies, and so
pnun = (1− e−µn)V n, (13)
5In contrast, Gregg and Petrongolo (1997) do not compute these at risk measures and instead
estimate (3) assuming λ = λM(Un, Vn; θ) which ignores the matching eﬀects due to the inflow of
new vacancies.
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where the inflow of new unemployed workers p o tentiall y match with the c urrent sto ck
of vacancies.
As the data is tem p orally aggregated, we a dopt the eco nome tric sp ecifica t i o n :
λn = λSF (vn , Un ; θ ); (14)
pn = p
SF (u n , V n ; θ ) (15)
w hich s ays t hat t h e s t o ck of unem ployed workersUn ma t ches a t r a t eλn with the
fl ow of new vacancies vn , while the flow of newly laid-oﬀ w rkers p otentially match
i mmed iate ly, with probability pn , w h th e s to ck of va ca nciesV n .
Give n these sp eci fica tions forλSF , pSF , the parameters θ and p er io d n data, (10)-
(15) jointl y determine (Un , V n ,λn , µn , pn , qn ). Exp e ct ed ma tches a re then
Mn (θ ) = Un (1− e−λn ) + pn un (16)
and we use MLE techniques to estimate θ .
4 .3 Job qu eu ei ng
This is a sp e cial c a se of sto ck flow matching w ith p = 0 and q = 1 ; i.e . there is
one-sided sto ck fl ow matchi ng wh ere t he sto ck o f une mployed worke rs matche s with
the flow of vacancies. This implies a directly testable, over-identifying restriction for
the stock-flow case.
5 Estimation
Depending on the assumed case - random matching or stock flow matching - and
model parameters θ, the previous section identifies expected monthly matches Mn(θ)
based on period n data (Un, Vn, un, vn). Actual matches cMn, however, are the outcome
of a random matching process. In each month there is approximately Un ‘trials’
where, in the United Kingdom, Un is of the order of a million. As each worker has a
m o nt hly match ing probability o f around 1/ 6 (e xp ec t ed du ra tion of une mploy me nt in
th e United Kingdom for this p e ri o d of time is around 6 months) we assume these large
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numbers imply realised matches, denoted cMn, are approximately normally distributed
with mean Mn(θ). We estimate θ using standard MLE techniques to solve
min
θ
X
n
[cMn −Mn(θ)]2, (17)
and assume the residual error is approximately Normal to construct standard errors.
5.1 The data
Constructing ‘at risk’ measures requires data which distinguish between vacancy flows
v and stocks V . Using inches of help-wanted advertisements to measure vacancies,
as is the general procedure for the United States,6 is not suﬃcient as there is no
information on whether a particular job advertisement is new or is a re-advertisement.
However Job Center data provides this information for the U.K. labor market.
The U.K. Job Center system is a network of government funded employment
agencies, where each town/city typically has at least one Job Center. A Job Center’s
services are free of charge to all users, both to job seekers and to firms advertising
vacancies. Indeed to be entitled to receive welfare payments, an unemployed benefit
claimant in the United Kingdom is required to register at a Job Center.7
The vast majority of Job Center vacancy advertisements are for unskilled and
semi-skilled workers. Certainly the professionally trained are unlikely to find suitable
jobs there. Nevertheless, as the bulk of unemployment is experienced by unskilled
a n d sem i-s kill ed wo rke r s (r a t h er t h a n by pr ofes sionals), it se em s r easonable t hat u n-
derstanding the determinants of re-employment hazard rates at this level of matching
provides useful diﬀerentiating information between competing theories of equilibrium
unemployment.
The data is a monthly time series running from September 1985 to December
1999 (172 observations). The d ata reco rd not o nl y the nu mb er unemployed ( Un) a d
number of unfilled vacancies (Vn) carried over from the previous month in the United
Kingdom, but also the number of new registered job seekers (un) and new vacancies
6See Abraham (1987) for a description of U.S. vacancy data.
7Gr eg g and Wa ds wo rt h ( 1 99 6) re p or t t hat Jo b Ce nt er s ar e us e d by ro ug hly 80 - 90 p e r c ent of t he
claima nt u nemployed, 2 5- 30% o f employed j ob seekers a nd 50% of employers.
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(vn) which register within each month n. The data also record the number of workers
who leave unemployment, and the number of vacancies which are filled, and either
may provide a measure of matches (Mn).
All data used are extracted from the Nomis databank and not seasonally adjusted.
The series are plotted in Figures 1 and 2. To improve visual inspection of our data,
the data series in these Figures are seasonally adjusted, while raw data are used in
estimation. As is also suggested in the Blanchard and Diamond (1989) data (see
the conclusion for further discussion), Figure 2 establishes that the monthly vacancy
outflow is very highly correlated with the inflow of new vacancies, and more weakly
correlated with the vacancy stock. Correlation coeﬃcients on raw data are 0.93 and
0.55 re sp e ctively. W hen o nly inc ludin g va canci es wh ich are fille d a t t he Job Center,
the correlation between filled and new vacancies becomes 10 times higher than that
between vacancies filled and the vacancy stock (0.78 and 0.08 respectively). For the
unemployed, the correlation coeﬃcient between the inflow and the outflow is 0.63,
and the one between the outflow and the stock is 0.54. Data also show a much
higher turnover rate for vacancies than for the unemployed: the relevant monthly
inflow/stock ratio being 0.15 for the unemployed and 1.12 for vacancies.
There are several data issues. First, we prefer to use unemployment outflow,
rather than vacancy outflow, as our measure of matches (Mn) . Given the high rate of
vacancy turnover, where the average duration of a vacancy coincides with the length
of the data period (one month), then having monthly vacancy inflows and outflows
on the two sides of the regression equation potentially produces spurious regression
results.8
OLS estimates of the random matching function, using unemployment outflow as
the left hand side variable, generates results which are reasonably consistent with the
literature. In particular, estimating a log-linear matching function a` la Blanchard
and Diamond (1989), the results are
lnMn = −2.207 + 0.235 lnVn + 0.809 lnUn,
(3.819) (0.149) (0.197)
(18)
8Results (not reported here) which use vacancy outflow as the measure of matches provide even
stronger support for stock flow matching.
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Figure 1: Monthly unemployment stock, inflow and outflow in Britain, September
1985-December 1999. Source: Nomis. Data seasonally adjusted.
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Figure 2: Vacancy stock, inflow and outflow in Britain, September 1985-December
1999. Source: Nomis. Data seasonally adjusted.
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where constant returns are not rejected (F = 0.88) and R2 = 0.74 (the regression in-
cludes both monthly and yearly dummies, with standard errors reported in brackets).
These results are fairly close to those obtained by Pissarides (1986) on a similar log
linear sp ecification for th e U.K.9  We c an therefore validly claim t hat o ur unde rlyin g
data is consistent with previous work in this field.
A sec ond iss ue is that va ca ncies a dvertised a t Job Centers a re on ly a f raction
of exi sting job op enin gs. Gregg and Wad sworth (1996) rep ort th at Job Centers are
u sed by rough ly 50% of em ployers. As we use log-linear functional forms,
this mismeasurement of total vacancies does not bias the results (apart from the
constant term) as long as we assume the fraction of vacancies advertised in U.K. Job
Centers remains constant over time. Nevertheless, we rescale the vacancy measures
so that the identifying restriction - that the measured number of vacancies which
match is equal to the number of unemployed job seekers that find work - is not
unreasonable. By constructing a series for total hires in the economy, we find that
filled Job Center vacancies account, on average, for 44% of total new hires in the
United Kingdom.10 We therefore rescale both Job Center vacancy measures Vn, and
vn, by dividing through by 0.44. This rescaling, however, is largely cosmetic - the
results are qualitatively identical without it.
The time series for the stocks of unemployment and vacancies are not stationary.11
Indeed there is quite a literature on so-called shifting ‘Beveridge curves’, which hints
at structural breaks in the long-run unemployment-vacancy relationship in Britain
9Note that in both equation (18) and Pissarides (1986) the vacancy elasticity is lower and the
unemployment elasticity is higher than in the findings of Blanchard and Diamond (1989), who
obtain estimates around 0.6 and 0.4, respectively. These diﬀerences are due to the diﬀerent choice
of dependent variable, see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, Section 4.2) for a discussion.
10Total hires can be proxied by Hn = un + ∆Nn, where ∆Nn is the net change in aggregate
employment and un is the inflow into unemployment in month n. If Mvn denotes total vacancies
filled in U.K. Job Centers, thenMvn/Hn is the fraction of hires accounted for by Job Center matching.
This statistic has average value 0.44 and has no discernible trend over the sample period.
A diﬀerent approach is to note that if vacancy outflow described total U.K. matches, then λn =
Mvn/Un would be the average exit rate out of unemployment in month n, and hence 1/λn = Un/Mvn
wo uld b e t he ave r ag e e xp e c te d dur at ion o f une m ployme nt (me a su re d in m onths ) . Co mputin g thi s
statistic implies an average duration of unemployment of around 14 months. In contrast, the actual
average duration of unemployment for this period is around 6.5 months. This ratio, [6.5]:[14] equals
0.46, and so suggests that Job Center vacancies account for 46% of the total in the U.K..
11ADF statistics (with 4 lags) are −1.181 and −0.806, respectively, against a 5% critical value of
−3.12.
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and e lsewhere (see Jackman et al. 1990 for a multi-c ountry study). The match-
ing structure defined above describes short-run variations in matching rates due to
short-run variations in labour market conditions. It cannot be used to explain long-
ru n m atching trends du e to, say, changes in the co mp osition o f the wo rkforce (more
wo rkers now atten d h igh er educ at ion), o r changes in job sk ill requ ireme nts , o r even
medium-term regional migration.
To focus on explaining the short-run variations on observed matching rates, an
obvious approach is to include year dummies. Tables 1 and 2 report the regression
results when year dummies are included. This approach has the disadvantage of gen-
erating discontinuous “jumps” at arbitrary discontinuity points, instead of a smooth
long-run trend. In our second set of results, presented in Tables 3 and 4 in the
Appendix, we do not include year dummies but detrend the data series instead, as
already done in the matching literature by Yashiv (2000), by filtering all time series
with a Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter, with smoothing parameter equal to 14400. To
preserve series means we have added to the detrended series their sample averages.
While data filtering fits a smooth long run trend through the data series instead of
discontinuous jumps, including year dummies on raw data has the advantage of esti-
mating structural breaks and matching function parameters simultaneously, allowing
for possible correlation between shift variables and other right-hand side variables.
As one would expect, the estimates using the filtered data imply predictions which
at times drift away from actual matches, but do a good job at reproducing the short-
run fluctuations. In contrast, the estimates using non-filtered data and year dummies
do not explain the short-run fluctuations so well, but do not drift so much from the
actual series. Most of the discussion that follows focusses on the non-filtered data
with year dummies. At the end we discuss the results using filtered data instead and
shall establish that the estimates and insights are qualitatively identical.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Random Matching.
Given some initial parameters θ0, then for each observation n = 1, ..., 172, we solve
numerically (5), (6), (7) and (8) for Un, V n,λn, µn. Predicted matches for each n are
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thenMn(θ0) = Un[1− exp(−λn)]. Assuming residual errors are Normally distributed,
a maximum likelihood estimator is obtained using a standard hill-climbing algorithm.
Given the identifying restrictions for random matching, Table 1 describes the MLE
results using various functional forms for λn = λM(.). As the data is not seasonally
adjusted, all estimated equations include monthly dummies, which turn out to be
jointly significant in all specifications.12
Column 1 assumes the standard Cobb-Douglas specification:
λn = exp
£
α0 + α1 lnV n + α2 lnUn
¤
.
The coeﬃcients on (time-aggregated) vacancies and unemployment have the expected
sign and are significantly diﬀerent from zero. Estimated matching elasticities around
0.5 are very much in line with the previous matching function estimates (see Petron-
golo a nd Pi ss arid es, 2001) a nd co nstant returns to s ca le in the match ing f unction are
not rejected, given a virtually zero Wald test statistics on the restriction α1 = −α2.
The extremely low value of this test statistic, however, together with a non-significant
constant term in λn makes one doubt that the elasticities on V n and Un are separately
identified. In Column 2 we impose constant returns to scale: the constant term is now
precisely determined, and the goodness of fit remains unchanged. In both Columns 1
and 2 the predicted value of λn is consistent with an expected unemployment duration
just below 6 months (computed as the sample average of 1/λn), which is roughly in
line with the actual unemployment duration during the sample period (6.5 months).
Comparing these results with those obtained using OLS (see the data description
section above) finds that the estimated vacancy coeﬃcient is much larger (0.52 rather
than 0.24), is highly significant and the fit is much improved (R2 = 0.86 rather than
0.74). Hence ignoring temporal aggregation results in a significant downward bias in
the vacancy coeﬃcient. The reason for this is that the initial vacancy stock Vn is a
poor proxy for the total number of vacancies at risk over the month. For example,
equation (6) for V n with µ = 0.08 (the mean value of µn estimated in Column 2)
implies V n = Vn + 0.57vn. This ‘at risk’ weighting (around one half) reflects the fact
that the entire stock of vacancies is ‘at risk’ from the very start of the month, while
12The exact specification used for predicted matches is Mn(θ) = Un[1− exp(−λn)]+ dummies.
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Table 1: Estimation results under random matching
1 2 3 4 5
lnλn constant −1.152
(3.055)
−1.120
(0.108)
−1.276
(2.366)
−1.217
(1.641)
−0.710
(0.058)
lnV n 0.539
(0.129)
0.524
(0.064)
−0.347
(0.142)
- -
ln vn - - 0.980
(0.090)
0.694
(0.058)
0.673
(0.035)
lnUn −0.534
(0.120)
−0.524a −0.597
(0.086)
−0.657
(0.074)
−0.673a
Log-likelihood -0.03582 -0.03593 -0.01424 -0.01567 -0.01610
R2 0.865 0.864 0.946 0.941 0.939
CRSb 0.001 - 0.047 0.102 -
monthly dummies = 0c 150.2 181.0 176.3 184.4 204.4
yearly dummies = 0d 32.2 37.0 120.0 100.1 97.3
ADF e -7.520 -4.523 -4.047 -4.065 -4.043
Sample averages:
λn 0.189 0.184 0.156 0.176 0.177
1/λn 5.6 5.8 6.8 6.1 6.1
µn 0.828 0.800 0.682 0.758 0.761
1/µn 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.5
Notes. Monthly data not seasonally adjusted. Dependent variable: vacancies filled at U.K.
J o b C e nte rs (a dj u s ted ) . All sp e ci fica ti o ns i nc l u de m ont h l y a nd ye a rl y du m mi e s . E s ti ma ti o n
metho d: non-li nea r least squares. Heteroskedatic-consistent sta ndard errors (Whi te, 1980 )
are reported in brackets. Predicted unemployment and vacancy durations are computed as
sample averages of 1/λn and 1/µn, respectively. No. Observations: 171. Source: NOMIS.
a. Coeﬃcient constrained to equal the value reported.
b. Wald test, distributed as χ2(1), of the hypothesis that the sum of the coeﬃcients on
lnV n, ln vn and lnUn is zero. Critical value at 5% significance level: χ2(1) = 3.841.
c. Wald test, distributed as χ2(11), of the hypothesis that monthly dummies are jointly
zero. Critical value at 5% significance level: χ2(11) = 19.675.
d . Wa l d t es t, d i s t r i bu te d a sχ2 (14 ), of t he hy p o th es is th at yea rl y du mmi es ar e j oi ntly z er o.
Critical value at 5% singificance level: χ2(14) = 23.685.
e. ADF statistics (four lags) for the presence of a unit root in the estimated residuals.
Critical value at 5% significance level: −2.23.
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new vacancies only enter the market gradually during the month. As the average
monthly inflow to stock ratio, vn/Vn is large (equal to 1.12), then Vn is a poor proxy
for V n. Further, as the unemployment outflow is highly correlated with the vacancy
inflow during the month, correcting for temporal aggregation bias results in a much
better fit and a higher estimated vacancy coeﬃcient.
Column 3 is a test of an overidentifying restriction - that random matching implies
the matching rate of individual workers does not depend directly on the inflow of new
vacancies. Column 3 asks whether including the flow of new vacancies as an added
explanatory variable for λn improves the fit. In fact the fit is not only much improved,
the vacancy stock variable becomes wrong signed. Column 4 drops the vacancy stock
term and the fit is essentially unchanged. In both Columns 3 and 4 constant returns
in the matching function are not rejected, and this restriction is again imposed in
Column 5.
Table 1 establishes that even when taking temporal aggregation of the data into
account, random matching is inconsistent with the high correlation between unem-
ployment outflow and the inflow of new vacancies.
5.2.2 Stock-Flow Matching.
Given some initial parameters θ0, then for each observation n we solve numerically
(10)-(15) for Un, V n,λn, µn, pn, qn. Predicted matches, Mn(θ0) are given by (16). A
standard hill climbing algorithm then identifies the MLE for θ.
Assuming errors are Normally distributed, the results for stock-flow matching are
reported in Table 2 under alternative specifications for λn = λSF (.) and pn = pSF (.).
Recall that in contrast to random matching, stock flow matching implies λn depends
on the vacancy inflow and not on the stock of vacancies. The pure job queueing
hypothesis in addition predicts pn = 0.
Column 1 adopts the functional form
λn = exp
¡
α0 + α1 lnV n + α2 ln vn + α3 lnUn
¢
while pn is estimated as a constant parameter, and constrained to be non-negative,
i.e. pn = exp(β0). Consistent with stock flow matching, Column 1 in Table 2 finds
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Table 2: Estimation results under stock-flow matching
1 2 3 4 5
lnλn constant −1.286
(3.411)
−1.311
(2.330)
−1.039
(0.143)
−1.011
(0.112)
−0.994
(0.191)
lnV n −0.159
(0.152)
ln vn 0.840
(0.052)
0.724
(0.094)
0.746
(0.048)
0.731
(0.040)
0.734
(0.056)
lnUn −0.677
(0.124)
−0.717
(0.095)
−0.746a −0.731a −0.734a
ln pn constant −0.932
(0.150)
−0.848
(0.125)
−0.996
(0.153)
−1.107
(0.174)
−1.124
(0.203)
lnV n −0.193
(0.176)
−0.236
(0.182)
ln vn −0.111
(0.249)
−0.161
(0.354)
lnun 0.304
a 0.236a 0.161a
log-likelihood -0.01039 -0.01067 -0.01053 -0.01061 -0.01091
R2 0.961 0.960 0.960 0.960 0.959
CRSb 0.0002 0.002 — — —
monthly dummies = 0c 276.6 300.7 304.5 294.3 334.1
year dummies = 0d 90.8 100.2 132.9 128.7 121.8
ADF e -5.382 -5.435 -5.412 -5.474 -8.668
Sample averages:
λn 0.102 0.102 0.117 0.122 0.124
pn 0.393 0.428 0.316 0.289 0.297
(1− pn) /λn 6.4 6.1 6.3 6.3 6.1
µn 0.273 0.300 0.235 0.214 0.219
qn 0.442 0.438 0.498 0.522 0.529
(1− qn) /µn 2.7 2.5 3.3 3.4 3.0
‘
Notes. Monthly data not seasonally adjusted. Dependent variable: vacancies filled at U.K.
J o b C e nte rs (a dj u s ted ) . All sp e ci fica ti o ns i nc l u de m ont h l y a nd ye a rl y du m mi e s . E s ti ma ti o n
metho d: non-li nea r least squares. Heteroskedatic-consistent sta ndard errors (Whi te, 1980 )
are reported in brackets. Predicted unemployment and vacancy durations are computed
as sample averages of (1 − pn)/λn and (1 − qn)/µn, respectively. No. observations: 171.
Source: NOMIS.
a. Coeﬃcient constrained to equal the value reported.
b. Wald test, distributed as χ2(1), of the hypothesis that the sum of the coeﬃcients on
lnV n and lnUn is zero. Critical value at 5% significance level: χ2(1) = 3.841.
c. Wald test, distributed as χ2(11), of the hypothesis that monthly dummies are jointly
zero. Critical value at 5% significance level: χ2(11) = 19.675.
d . Wa l d t es t, d i s t r i bu te d a sχ2 (14 ), of t he hy p o th es is th at yea rl y du mmi es ar e j oi ntly z er o.
Critical value at 5% singificance level: χ2(14) = 23.685.
e. ADF statistics (four lags) for the presence of a unit root in the estimated residuals.
Critical value at 5% signific an ce l evel : −2. 23 .

that λ is driven by the inflow of new vacancies, and that the vacancy stock eﬀect
is insignifi cant (and wrong-s ign ed). Column 2 d rop s th e vac an cy sto ck from t he
specification of λn and re-estimates. The results establish that the exit rates of
the longer term unemployed, λn, are driven by the inflow of new vacancies with an
estimated elasticity around 0.7, with crowding out by other unemployed job seekers.
Further, the pure job queueing hypothesis is rejected - the matching probability of
the newly unemployed, pn, is around 0.4, and is significantly diﬀerent from zero, with
a standard error of 0.059.13
Columns 3-5 consider a more general specification for
pn = exp
¡
β0 + β1 lnV n + β2 ln vn + β3 lnun
¢
while leaving the specification of λn as in column 2, which is consistent with the
identifying assumptions. Unfortunately the parameter estimates only converge when
we impose constant returns on the estimation routine; i.e. set α2 + α3 = 0 and
β1+ β2+ β3 = 0.14 We are therefore unable to test for constant returns to matching.
When imposing constant returns in columns 3-5, we still get a positive pn, but no
variables seem to explain it well. Column 4 is the ‘stock-flow’ specification, that p
depends on the vacancy stock but not the inflow, but the vacancy variable is wrong
signed and insignificant. The results for p are therefore a little disappointing, but we
note throughout that the estimates for λ are robust to these variations.
Column 2, being the most parsimonious specification is the most preferred. It
implies that around 40% of newly unemployed workers quickly find work. The exit
rates of those that fail to match quickly are driven by the inflow of new vacancies
with crowding out by other competing job seekers. The overall fit (R2 = 0.96) is
also better than all specifications in Table 1, even those that (inconsistently) include
vacancy inflow.
13Using the delta method: var(pn) = exp(2 ∗ β0)var(β0) = 0.003.
14This perhaps reflects a multi-collinearity problem between V n and vn.Note that all specifications
in Table 2 give an identical fit, and so column 2, the most parsimonious specification is the most
preferred.
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5.3 The Results Using HP Filtered Data.
We quickly discuss Tables 3 and 4 which describe the results when the data is first
passed through an HP filter and the identifying equations estimated without year
dummies. The results are qualitatively identical. For the random matching case
(Tab le 3), colu mn 2 acce pts constant return s to ma tchi ng and estimates a sli ghtly
higher vacancy coeﬃcient (0.64). Column 3 is the over-identifying test which says that
the vacancy inflow term should have no significant impact on λ. As before including
vacancy inflow results in a much better fit and the vacancy stock term becomes wrong
signed. The conclusion is the same - random matching is inconsistent with the high
correlation between unemployment outflow and the inflow of new vacancies.
Table 4 estimates stock flow matching. As in Table 2, the estimates of λ are robust
across all specifications and implies that the stock of longer term unemployed workers
are waiting for new suitable vacancies to come onto the market. As in Table 2, no
variable s se em t o ex plain p well, a d column 2 is again the pref erred s p eci fica t i o n .
In fa c t, t he resu lts of column 2 in Ta ble 4 are inte r es ting for se veral r eas o ns.
Over this data period, the average completed spell of unemployment was 6.5 months.
Further Coles et al. (2003) report that the average uncompleted spell of unemploy-
ment across the stock of unemployed workers had a mean value of around 14 months.
N ote, column 2 es tima tes λ = 0.07. He nce c on ditional on rem ai ning unem ployed, it
predicts an average spell of unemployment 1/λ = 14 months. Column 2 also implies
that conditional on becoming unemployed, the expected duration of unemployment
is (1 − p)/λ = 6.8 months. A third surprising feature is that it predicts q = 0.31
which is also on the button; Coles and Smith (1998) report that approximately 30%
of new vacancies are filled on the first day of being posted.
The o nl y samp le mean c olu mn 2 fails to predic t ade qu at e ly is t he ave r ag e du r at ion
of a vacancy. The sample average is between 3 and 4 weeks, but the final row of
co lumn 2 pre dicts average duration ( 1 − q )/µ = 2.2 months.  At first sight, this
seems to be an important failure of the model. Note, however, that all specifications,
in Tables 1-4, overestimate this statistic (see the bottom rows in each Table). A
potential explanation for this is that approximately 1/3 of all vacancies are withdrawn
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Table 3: Estimation results under random matching
1 2 3 4 5
lnλn constant −1.130
(3.045)
−1.122
(0.090)
−1.290
(2.352)
−1.222
(1.896)
−0.826
(0.083)
lnV n 0.610
(0.135)
0.637
(0.089)
−0.269
(0.142)
- -
ln vn - - 0.856
(0.101)
0.700
(0.072)
0.680
(0.057)
lnUn −0.612
(0.134)
−0.637a −0.559
(0.103)
−0.671
(0.105)
−0.680a
Log-likelihood -0.03616 -0.03618 -0.02225 -0.02297 -0.02327
R2 0.663 0.663 0.793 0.786 0.783
CRSb 0.00005 - 0.030 0.047 -
monthly dummies = 0c 153.9 169.8 117.9 126.0 132.4
ADF d -6.160 -3.703 -3.358 -3.364 -3.362
Sample averages:
λn 0.155 0.155 0.148 0.149 0.149
1/λn 6.5 6.5 6.9 6.8 6.8
µn 0.623 0.623 0.588 0.592 0.592
1/µn 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7
Notes. Monthly data not seasonally adjusted. Dependent variable: vacancies filled at U.K.
J o b C e nte rs (a dj u s ted ) . All sp e ci fica ti o ns i nc l u de m ont h l y a nd ye a rl y du m mi e s . E s ti ma ti o n
metho d: non-li nea r least squares. Heteroskedatic-consistent sta ndard errors (Whi te, 1980 )
are reported in brackets. Predicted unemployment and vacancy durations are computed as
sample averages of 1/λn and 1/µn, respectively. No. Observations: 171. Source: NOMIS.
a. Coeﬃcient constrained to equal the value reported.
b. Wald test, distributed as χ2(1), of the hypothesis that the sum of the coeﬃcients on
lnV n, ln vn and lnUn is zero. Critical value at 5% significance level: χ2(1) = 3.841.
c. Wald test, distributed as χ2(11), of the hypothesis that monthly dummies are jointly
zero. Critical value at 5% significance level: χ2(11) = 19.675.
d . Wa l d t es t, d i s t r i bu te d a sχ2 (14 ), of t he hy p o th es is th at yea rl y du mmi es ar e j oi ntly z er o.
Critical value at 5% singificance level: χ2(14) = 23.685.
e. ADF statistics (four lags) for the presence of a unit root in the estimated residuals.
Critical value at 5% significance level: −2.23.
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Table 4: Estimation results under stock-flow matching
1 2 3 4 5
lnλn constant −1.252
(4.198)
−1.201
(3.301)
−1.063
(0.322)
−1.323
(0.236)
−1.342
(0.577)
lnV n −0.199
(0.198)
ln vn 0.852
(0.142)
0.792
(0.125)
0.815
(0.072)
0.889
(0.094)
0.854
(0.124)
lnUn −0.676
(0.170)
−0.810
(0.173)
−0.815a −0.889a −0.854a
ln pn constant −0.636
(0.116)
−0.600
(0.108)
−0.829
(0.208)
−0.603
(0.134)
−0.597
(0.235)
lnV n −0.151
(0.284)
−0.012
(0.139)
ln vn −0.318
(0.404)
−0.090
(0.395)
lnun 0.469
a 0.012a 0.090a
log-likelihood -0.01290 -0.01277 -0.01275 -0.01287 -0.01274
R2 0.880 0.881 0.881 0.880 0.881
CRSb 0.006 0.006 — — —
monthly dummies = 0c 251.3 283.6 248.6 260.4 324.0
ADF d -3.870 -3.867 -3.882 -3.772 -7.289
Sample averages:
λn 0.071 0.068 0.097 0.068 0.070
pn 0.529 0.549 0.348 0.542 0.517
(1− pn) /λn 6.8 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1
µn 0.310 0.322 0.208 0.317 0.312
qn 0.321 0.308 0.441 0.307 0.317
(1− qn) /µn 2.3 2.2 2.9 2.3 2.3
Notes. Monthly data not seasonally adjusted. Dependent variable: vacancies filled at U.K.
J o b C e nte rs (a dj u s ted ) . All sp e ci fica ti o ns i nc l u de m ont h l y a nd ye a rl y du m mi e s . E s ti ma ti o n
metho d: non-li nea r least squares. Heteroskedatic-consistent sta ndard errors (Whi te, 1980 )
a r e re p or ted i nbrackets. Predicted unemployment and vacancy durations are computed
as sample averages of (1 − pn)/λn and (1 − qn)/µn, respectively. No. observations: 171.
Source: NOMIS.
a. Coeﬃcient constrained to equal the value reported.
b. Wald test, distributed as χ2(1), of the hypothesis that the sum of the coeﬃcients on
lnV n and lnUn is zero. Critical value at 5% significance level: χ2(1) = 3.841.
c. Wald test, distributed as χ2(11), of the hypothesis that monthly dummies are jointly
zero. Critical value at 5% significance level: χ2(11) = 19.675.
d . Wa l d t es t, d i s t r i bu te d a sχ2 (14 ), of t he hy p o th es is th at yea rl y du mmi es ar e j oi ntly zero.
Critical value at 5% singificance level: χ2(14) = 23.685.
e. ADF statistics (four lags) for the presence of a unit root in the estimated residuals.
Critical value at 5% significance level: −2.23.
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unfilled from Job Centers (me asured as the diﬀerence b e twee n vacancy outflow a n d
va c a n c i e s filled ). To c orrect ou r e stimates for the average duration of a vacancy,
suppose that vacancies are also withdrawn exogenously according to a Poisson rate
s. Further suppose that sV = (1/3)v, so that on average one third of all vacancies
are withdrawn unfilled. As the sample average v/V = 1.12, this suggests s ≈ 0.37.
We now use s = 0.37 to correct the estimates of the average duration of a vacancy
by replacing the estimated exit rate µ with the gross exit rate µ+ s.
Fo r ex am ple, Colum n 2 in Tab le 1 (random m atching) find s µ = 0.8 w hich, u ncor-
rected, predicts an average vacancy duration 1/µ = 1.4 months, but corrected implies
1/(µ+s) = 0.85 which is then consistent with the sample average. Similarly, column 2
in Table 2 (sto ck-flow m atching) pre dicts a n ave rage vac a ncy duration (1− q )/µ = 2. 5
months. The correction implies expected duration (1 − q)/(µ + s) = 0.84 months.
Column 4 in Table 2 seems to do the most badly, predicting an average vacancy
duration of 3.4 months, but when corrected yields (1 − q)/(µ + s) = 0.82 months.
Finally, this correction for Column 2 in Table 4 implies an average vacancy duration
of one month, which is slightly high but is clearly consistent with the sample mean.
6 Conclusion
There is a large literature which estimates the so-called “matching function”. This
paper shows how to test those results against a ‘stock-flow’ alternative while correcting
for temporal aggregation bias. Using U.K. Job Center matching data over the period
1985-99, the results find that the random matching function fits the aggregate data
reasonably well, but is inconsistent with the high correlation between unemployment
outflow and the inflow of new vacancies. In contrast, stock-flow matching captures
this feature of the data well. It also provides compelling evidence that the longer-term
unemployed wait for suitable vacancies to come onto the market.
At first sight, stock-flow matching seems to suggest there are no trading frictions.
This is not true. For example, Lagos (2000) considers spatial mismatch where, in a
taxi market context, some taxi ranks have taxis waiting for customers, while at other
taxi ranks, some customers are waiting for taxis. By introducing a hold-up problem,
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Coles (1999) also shows that stock flow matching can lead to multiple Pareto rankable
trading equilibria which are analogous to Diamond (1982). Instead of a thick market
externality though, there is a turnover externality where a higher entry rate of new
traders reduces the time lost waiting for suitable matches to enter the market.
It has been argued by others that this paper does not describe a ‘fair’ test against
the matching approach as it does not allow agent heterogeneity in the random match-
ing case, and so it is no surprise that a simple aggregate matching function is rejected
by the data. There are two responses to this criticism. The first is pragmatic - there
is a large literature which estimates Cobb-Douglas matching functions and a corre-
sponding policy literature which uses those estimates to calibrate matching models
and so infer optimal labour market policy. Our results establish this approach can be
highly misleading. The second response is to concur with the underlying principle of
the criticism. Agent heterogeneity is an essential component of the stock-flow match-
ing approach - some newly unemployed workers are on the short side of the market
and quickly find work, others are on the long side and have to wait for something
suitable to come onto the market. Perhaps a hybrid framework would be the most
compelling where, rather than match immediately, workers on the short side instead
face some search frictions and so take time to locate their most preferred vacancy and
start work.
Unfortunately such an econometric structure cannot be identified on the data used
here (given there are temporal aggregation issues). Nevertheless, such a structure
would not be unlike the empirical search literature which assumes two types, where
proportion p of entrants match at rate λs, and (1−p) match at rate λL where λs > λL
(e .g. Lanc a ster and Nicke ll (1980); He ckman an d S inger (1984)). Supp ose in stead
then, that workers on the short side match quickly but not immediately, say around
a month λs = 1. Fitting the average duration of a completed spell of unemployment
(6.5 months), and the average uncompleted spell of unemployment across unemployed
workers (14 months) in a steady state requires values
1− p ≈ 0.4 and λL ≈ 1/15.
These values (and steady state) imply that 40% of entrants are on the long side of
26
the market, while 91% of those in the unemployment stock are on the long side. The
average completed spell of unemployment is then 0.6[1]+0.4[15] = 6.6 months while
the average uncompleted spell is 0.09[1]+0.91[15]= 13.7 months. A possible interpre-
tation of the overidentifyi ng test for the random matching f un ction (co lumn 3, Ta bles
1 and 3) is that it shows that the majority of workers in the unemployment stock [Un]
match with the inflow of new vacancies. The stock-flow matching hypothesis instead
identifies the data by assuming λs =∞ and then estimates mean values
1− p ≈ 0.45 and λL ≈ 1/(14.7)
( see column 2, Ta ble 4 ). This app roach provid es little infor m a ti on on the m at chin g
behaviour of the short-term unemployed (those on the short side of the market), but
identifies seemingly robust estimates of λL which strongly suggest that the longer-
term unemployed wait for suitable new vacancies to come onto the market.
With this interpretation in mind, we can re-interpret the Blanchard and Dia-
mond (1989) data on matching in the U.S.. Figure 3, which is taken from Blanchard
and Diamond (1989), describes the number of unemployed workers who find work
each month and the stocks of unemployed workers and vacancies in the U.S. man-
ufacturing sector. Blanchard and Diamond (1989) estimate the aggregate matching
process assuming random matching and do not attempt to identify other theories of
unemployment on these data. However note that these data are also consistent with
stock-flow matching. To see why, note that the measured number of matches is much
more volatile than the measured change in the stock of vacancies. This implies that
a large increase in the number of matches is highly correlated with a large increase
in the inflow of new vacancies, thereby leaving the stock of vacancies largely intact.
Otherwise, if the inflow of new vacancies were fairly smooth, a large increase in the
number of matches would necessarily result in a large fall in the stock of vacancies.
The inflow of new vacancies, rather than the stock of current vacancies, is more
important in explaining short-run fluctuations in matching rates. It is exactly this
feature of the U.K. data which drives the results obtained here.
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Figure 3: New hires, vacancies and unemployment in the U.S., 1968-1981. Source:
Blanchard and Diamond (1989).
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